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Both what we share and don’t
share with our primate cousins make
us human. Easy enough to start a
list. At least since Darwin, most
would rate moral sentiments as dis-
tinctively human. But our modern
selves didn’t emerge from ancestral
apes in one step. When did popula-
tions along the way become human?
Before our big modern brains, before
language, and before pair bonds, our
longer lives, later maturity, and ear-
lier weaning could have evolved in
an already smart and gregarious
ancestor due to rearing help from
grandmothers. Although cooperative
hunting and lethal between-group
aggression are often nominated as
evolutionary foundations for human
prosociality, neither distinguishes us
from chimpanzees. Grandmothering
does. Our grandmothering life his-
tory intensified selection on infant
appetites and capacities for social
engagement, the foundation of our
moral faculties.
What could have led to these
changes in hominin life history?
Plio-Pleistocene climates posed great
challenges as increased aridity and
seasonality constricted the distribu-
tion of foods that ancestral ape
youngsters could effectively handle.
That left mothers two choices: follow
the retreating foods and maintain
the diets their weanlings could man-
age or subsidize them longer.
Increased juvenile dependence would
allow mothers to remain in habitats
inhospitable to youngsters and move
into new ones as well. Although
extended juvenile neediness would
seem to reduce a mother’s reproduc-
tive success, it offered a novel fitness
opportunity for older females with
declining fertility. This novel oppor-
tunity is central to the Grandmother
Hypothesis: by provisioning grand-
children, elders would allow younger
females to bear subsequent babies
sooner without net losses in off-
spring survival. As more vigorous
grandmothers left more descendants,
rates of aging slowed. That raised
longevity and the fraction of female
years lived past the fertile ages. The
reduction in adult mortality lowered
the risk of dying before reproducing,
favoring delayed maturity to net the
benefits of further growth to larger
adult size.
Our characteristic postmenopausal
longevity has long been recognized
as a major clue to the evolution of
human life history. But when George
Williams tackled it more than half a
century ago, menopause was still
thought to be uniquely human. He
proposed that it evolved because
other changes in our lineage made
late births riskier and offspring more
dependent. Subsequent evidence
shows that women don’t stop early.
Female fertility ends at similar ages
in humans and the other great apes.
The human difference is not meno-
pause, but our slower somatic aging.
Other apes become frail during the
fertile years and rarely outlive them.
Not so humans. Among traditional
hunter-gatherers, a girl lucky enough
to survive childhood usually has
more than a 70% chance of living
beyond the childbearing years; and
women are more economically
productive after menopause than
before it.
In these hunter-gatherer popula-
tions, the standing fraction of adult
women beyond the childbearing ages
is near a third, even though life
expectancies at birth are less than 40
years. Life expectancies in that range
contribute to another common mis-
take. The fact that the highest
national life expectancy now almost
doubles the global record of 1850 is
widely cited as evidence that post-
menopausal survival is an artifact of
recent history. But life expectancies
at birth are not measures of longev-
ity. Instead they are very sensitive to
the short lives of dying babies and
rise dramatically when infant and
juvenile mortality decline.
Sarah Hrdy revealed a momentous
implication of our grandmothering
life history in developing her Cooper-
ative Breeding Hypothesis. Hrdy
does not privilege grandmothers as I
do here, but her synthesis identifies
far-reaching consequences of human
mothers’ reliance on others for suc-
cessful childrearing. Great ape moth-
ers focus on one infant at a time.
But human mothers have overlap-
ping dependents to juggle and must
worry about the availability and dis-
position of helpers. As a result,
human babies, unlike other ape
infants, cannot count on their moth-
er’s full attention. Both mothers and
grandmothers have investment alter-
natives; in high-mortality environ-
ments, their commitment can mean
life or death. So grandmothering
makes infant survival more subject
to variation in infants’ own abilities
to engage caregivers. Human infants’
sensitivity to that engagement leaves
them (ironically?) more psychologi-
cally vulnerable to social approval.
The increased stakes for infants in-
tensify the sociality that we share
with other primates. Social bonds
matter across the order, as demon-
strated by long-term demographic
and behavioral observations, experi-
ments, and hormonal assays, both in
the wild and captivity. Starting from
ancestral ape sociality, grandmother-
ing magnifies selection pressures for
desires and capacities to engage mu-
tual attention in earliest life. So the
social virtues Darwin identified as
distinctively human need not depend
on the bigger brains and language
that certainly distinguish us. Instead,
our brains, language, and even pair
bonds may depend on the prior evo-
lution of strong appetites for shared
intentions, with sensitivity to praise
and blame selected in ancestral
youngsters reared in environments
with ancestral grandmothering.
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